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Rationing Justice
By

THOMAS EHRLICH

SECOND ORISON S. MARDEN MEMORIAL LECTURE
DELIVERED BEFORE

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
DECEMBER 13,

1979

The title for my remarks tonight comes from a speech by my
mentor, Judge Learned Hand, some three decades ago at the
7 5 th Anniversary Dinner of The New York Legal Aid Society.
As always, he spoke with force and eloquence, though his comments were extemporaneous. In essence, he sought support for
legal help to those without funds to pay for that help. That same
theme is at the core of my comments tonight. Judge Hand concluded with an aphorism that has become the centerpiece of legal
services litany. "If we are to keep our democracy, there must be
one commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice."
Those who recall that golden era of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals will recall another aphorism: "Quote Learned, but
follow Gus," referring of course, to Judge Augustus HandLearned's cousin and colleague on the court. Like so many quips,
it was funny precisely because, in its exaggeration of truth, it contained some truth.
My own message can be simply stated. It begins with a commonplace: Justice is rationed in this country. Justice is limited for
those who have access to it, and access itself is sharply limited in
quality and quantity. That message is hardly new; the point has
been made in varying terms of sadness and anger for years. My
point is not simply that justice is rationed, Judge Hand notwithstanding. Rather my concern tonight is how justice is rationed,
and the complementary roles of public funds and private lawyers
Editor's Note: The author is Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency. He was first President of Legal Services Corporation, and is former
Dean of Stanford Law School.
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in improving the rationing process. In brief, my view is that more
public planning as well as public funding is needed and that all
lawyers have a responsibility to provide some of their time and
talents to ensure that the operations of the legal system are as just
as possible. We cannot avoid rationing justice. But we can, I think,
do a better job of it. I am immodest enough to hope that Orison
Marden would have applauded this message. In all events, it seeks
to reflect the public spirit that marked his professional life.
Those who organized this distinguished lecture series suggested
that I might use the opportunity to comment on my experience
with the Legal Services Corporation, to engage in a little nostalgia
about a glorious endeavor about which I maintain a deep and continuing faith.
I should emphasize at the outset that I shifted from the Corporation, in major measure, because I found myself spending more
time defending my past practices than planning future improvements. I know well, the person chosen by the Corporation's Board
of Directors as my successor, and I am sure that he will develop
his own ideas for the future, with the comforting (and wholly
proper) knowledge that he can-for some time-follow that fundamental rule of a good bureaucrat: Blame it on his predecessor,
a ploy I would have used as well, if I but had a predecessor. On
that basis, I hope you will let me indulge in some personal reflections on past developments in the rationing system before I suggest some tentative thoughts about legal services in the future.
I
I came to the Legal Services Corporation from Stanford Law
School where for more than a decade I had taught and then been
dean. A primary role of a dean is to consider public legal needs in
the future and then to work to ensure that students gain the best
possible education to meet those needs. From this perspective at
Stanford, I became increasingly concerned about the rationing of
justice. I slowly awoke to a reality that many of you have known
much more clearly and intimately for much longer-the reality
that most people are unable to have most of their legal concerns
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handled at all within the legal system, let alone handled well. As
I lectured and learned from the vantage-point of a law school
deanship, it became sharply and uncomfortably clear to me that
average citizens in general, and poor people in particular, are
generally denied access to justice and are unable to obtain equal
justice from the legal system, even when access is available.
The main reason, of course, is money-the cost of the lawyering
services needed to gain access to the system, and especially the cost
of quality lawyering necessary to gain the best possible result
within the law.
The recently-released ABA survey of legal needs underscores
these conclusions with harsh facts. The survey shows, for example,
that only one percent of persons consulted a lawyer when faced
with what they thought was unlawful job discrimination. Most
often, of course, the discrimination was based on race or sex.
With little first-hand knowledge, but great expectations, I
jumped at the chance to participate in helping to change this
reality. What an extraordinary opportunity it seemed-and was:
A chance to be involved in an area I care about with passion and
to help build an organization from the start. To one who enjoys
institutional architecture on the one hand and a steep learning
curve on the other, it was a unique opportunity, and I reveled in
it. I knew I had much to learn, though I did not realize that the
most important lessons would come in very human form from the
extraordinary men and women with whom I was privileged to
work.
It was clear to me at the outset that a central task would be to
convince those within the legal services community that the Corporation was here to stay-that after four years of trauma, danger,
and brutal politics, the battle for survival had been won and the
hard next issue was what we were going to do with victory. A comfortable cohesion comes from a single-issue struggle, particularly
when the issue is the very existence of one's professional commitment. The struggle so overshadows and subsumes other issues that
it engenders a battlefield esprit often exhilerating to experience.
I continually encountered legal services lawyers who would stop
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in the middle of some current controversy to recall-with moist
nostalgia-the struggle, for example, when the Vice President of
the United States, Spiro Agnew, called for the abolition of federally-funded legal services.
I do not question, let alone criticize, that and other glorious
encounters in the trenches. The issues were vital, justice did triumph, and that happened only because of the dedication and hard
work of an incredible band of believers. But beginning the reconstruction of legal services made me feel a little like Clement Atlee
must have felt taking over as Prime Minister after Churchill won
the war but lost the election.
In all events, our initial priority was clear, at least in my own
view. We had to establish a goal for the next three or four yearsa goal to serve several important ends. First, it should underscore
to the public, to Congress, and (most of all) to those in legal services that survival was no longer the issue but rather how well we
would serve those who so much needed our help, how effectively
we provided aggressive advocacy for poor people. Second it should
-if properly designed-provide a coherent framework for Corporation efforts over the next few years.
At the time, civil legal programs for poor people were located
mainly in the East and West, with a lesser number in the midWest and relatively few in the South and Southwest. Further, federal funding of these programs varied from less than $i per poor
person to more than $i o. Both of these disparities were largely the
result of the historical circumstances in which OEO funded programs in the mid-i 96os. Quite naturally and properly, funds went
to areas where bar and other groups actively sought the support
and faced relatively little opposition.
By 1975, however, when the Corporation was established, communities throughout the country were pressing for programs, and
I was sure that, if we did our job right, we could promote that
climate in every locality.
We had to move quickly and we did. Within a few months of
the Corporation's creation, we designed what came to be called
the minimum-access plan-A funding formula to provide every
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area throughout the country with a legal-services program that
would include the equivalent of at least two lawyers plus supporting staff for every io,ooo persons living below the poverty line,
about $3700 of annual income for an individual or $7300 for a
family of four.
Why two lawyers? Because it was roughly the standard of the
then-existing best funded programs and, no less important, it
seemed a realistic (though optimistic) goal for the near term. It
was also easy to understand. When we talked to most members of
Congress and explained that we were trying to ensure that poor
people had some chance to use the legal system-though at a level
far less than the 11 lawyers per 1o,ooo people in the population
generally-few people said that this was a terrible idea. However
conservative, few fought the basic concept that poor people are
entitled to use the legal system.
Interestingly, almost no one asked, "Why legal services?" Whatever their views about other kinds of social programs, those in
Congress with whom I talked seemed to understand that legal
services are essential for poor people. For myself, there are at least
four basic reasons: (i) Because legal services are an effective means
to ameliorate the effects of poverty; (2) because the hurdles imposed by the legal system should not be insurmountable due to
poverty; (3) because many of the substantive rules of law and the
institutions that apply them affect the poor unfairly; and (4) because access to the legal system is an inherent right of all within
this country; otherwise, the system itself becomes dangerously
skewed.
These reasons are not inconsistent, let alone mutually exclusive
responses, though each implies a somewhat different ordering of
priorities in the provision of legal services.
We followed a conscious policy that permitted local programs
to set their own priorities among substantive areas of the law and
types of proceedings, but required them to adopt a process for
doing so that involved their client communities. As a result, housing was the most important issue in South Boston, native lands
claims in Hawaii, and so forth. By the end of this fiscal year, more
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than i,ooo legal services offices will provide minimum access coverage to over 30 million poor people. Over 6,ooo lawyers and
2,2oo paralegals and other staff members work in these offices.
Federal funding has grown to $300 million annually, after being
frozen at $71 million for five years before the Corporation began
operations.
In this sense, of course, the plan has worked. But it had weaknesses as well. Some we saw clearly at the outset; others became
evident only over time. The most obvious limitation was the onedimensional character of the plan. The stress on access made it
appear to some that we did not care about the quality of justice
once "minimum access" was achieved. The emphasis on two lawyers per io,ooo poor people might have made it seem to them that
this minimum level was sufficient. They interpreted the uniformity of the approach to mean that all poor people faced the same
quantity and difficulty of legal concerns.
In fact, of course, those conclusions were not intended; each is
false. Access to legal services is only part of the problem, and not
always the most difficult part. Two lawyers cannot handle more
than a small fraction of even the most acute crises facing io,ooo
poor people. Though the broad categories of legal concerns among
poor people are strikingly similar throughout the country-8o%
are in the areas of family law, consumer law, housing law, and
administrative law-there are wide variations and many groups
for which access is particularly difficult or that face special types
of legal concerns. Physically and mentally handicapped persons,
the elderly, and native Americans are examples of those groups.
We moved first to raise the funding of existing programs to a
minimum level, and second to provide services in areas where
none existed at all. We then developed a third stage that extends
the differentiation process of funding needed to take realistic account of the varying needs among poor people throughout the
country. Now that the minimum access effort is nearly complete,
this third stage effort will proceed at an accelerated pace.
Concerns were raised by local programs, by some in Congress,
and by others, about many of the hundreds of particular decisions

MARDEN LECTURE

and non-decisions that were made by the Corporation during my
tenure. It is probably only fair to add that from no city was the
discordant noise level higher than from this one. With lo separate
programs operating under one umbrella, legal services in New
York reminds me of nothing so much as a set of medieval fiefdoms
or perhaps a law-school faculty. But the people involved-here
and throughout the country-were and are extraordinary. I could
have used a little healthy skepticism from time to time, but I was
willing to forego that quality-so cherished by Learned Handto maintain the almost total lack of cynicism that exists. Legal
services is populated by an incredible crew of true believers, and
I hope it never changes.
II
One criticism of the minimum-access approach is worth special
attention, however, for it focuses on the future. The very fact that
we set a goal and achieved it-some have suggested-means that
the goal was too modest and even harmful, for those in Congress
now have an excuse for not providing further funding.
My response is that our success in achieving the minimum access goal makes it essential to design and implement a new plan
for the future. What should that plan be? A number of shortterm efforts are already underway, the result of a substantial planning program that took place over the last year. But a major new
planning initiative is now needed to map the Corporation's
longer-range strategy.
That initiative should not be simply an effort to expand support for legal services to the equivalent of 3 or 4 lawyers per
io,ooo poor people instead of 2 per io,ooo. My point is not that
more lawyers are unnecessary. They are very much needed. But
for tactical as well as substantive reasons, I am convinced that this
would be an unwise approach.
As a matter of tactics, the approach would be unacceptable to
members of Congress for they would see it involving an endless
path-first 2 lawyers per io,ooo, then 3, then 4-without any
prospect or basis for stopping. More significant, in substantive
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terms this approach would avoid coming to grips with what I
think is the key question facing those of us concerned about legal
services for the public. Simply put, it is this: Assuming-as I dothat all Americans are entitled to a fair system of rationing justice,
what ought to be the standards?
In my own view, a national effort is initially needed-led by the
American Bar Association in cooperation with the Legal Services
Corporation and other interested organizations-to be followed
by community efforts sponsored by local bar associations. I hope
also that a few major city bar groups-perhaps including this onewill undertake pilot studies of community legal needs and then
design plans to ensure that those needs are met. I believe that
within a few years-say by i 98 5 -the needs for federal fundings of
legal services for poor people should be based on this larger planning process.
Over the past few years I have spent some time reviewing community health and nutrition planning efforts, and I realize how
much controversy surrounds those efforts. Further I know that
it is far more difficult to measure legal needs than needs for particular vitamins and minerals. Nonetheless, I do think it is possible to use a major survey of legal needs sponsored by the ABA
to provide a framework for this approach.
In essence, the survey shows the incidence of legal problems in
each of 29 main substantive areas and the range of variation based
on age, sex, race, and other factors. The survey has been criticized
on several grounds. It did not include a number of types of legal
issues, including some of particular concern to poor people. Perhaps most significant, it covered only those legal problems that the
respondents could identify. Almost all people face problems from
time to time about which they do not obtain legal counsel solely
because they are unaware that the law may offer solutions. Several studies have tried to measure these matters, though obviously this is extremely difficult.
In all events, the survey can be used to set a basic typology of
legal needs for average communities. My suggestion is that individual bar groups analyze the range of probable legal needs of
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the population as a whole within their communities, using the
survey data as a base and modifying it as appropriate in light of
local circumstances. In a number of communities, important parts
of this work have already been done by legal services programs.
The next step is to examine the extent to which these needs are
met, community by community, and to design plans to meet at
least minimum requirements in major substantive legal areas.
Leadership in developing such plans should be in local bar associations working in collaboration with local legal services programs and other community groups. State groups should step in
if local ones do not take the lead. Depending on the income levels
of the community, a large share of the needs can be met by private lawyers on an individually negotiated fee basis. This is generally true of the legal problems of most businesses and of many
individuals as well. Further, in some substantitve areas-wills, for
example-this approach is sufficient for most people who seek the
service. As a rule, matters that essentially involve voluntary economic transfers should bear the market cost of those transfers. But
a significant share of the legal concerns facing average individuals
are of a different character.
An almost infinite variety of possible typologies could be designed in analyzing the extent to which government ought to
finance, in whole or in part, the costs of legal services to meet those
concerns. Currently, we look solely to ability to pay. To the extent funds are available, legal service offices provide free assistance
to those with incomes below poverty levels. Given a demand by
poor people for those services in every community that far exceeds resources, priorities among types of problems must be established, as I indicated.
What about those whose incomes are not far above poverty
lines? Currently, most of those persons are also effectively outside the legal system. Except in situations when a contingent fee
can be negotiated, they can rarely use the system.
What about extending publicly-funded legal assistance to those
with income levels somewhat above bare subsistence, but nonetheless well below levels that enable funding of a private lawyer
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at unsubsidized fees? The statute establishing the Corporation
authorizes service to all those "unable to afford" it, not just to the
very poorest. The understandable response of many who currently work in, or benefit from, publicly-funded legal assistance
programs is that the scarce public resources currently available
ought to be used exclusively for indigents, since they are most in
need. They properly emphasize that, to a poor person, a legal
problem is all too often a crisis-a dispute with a landlord may

mean no housing, a car that breaks down and does not meet its
warranty may result in unemployment, denial of social security
benefits may literally mean starvation. All too often, for a poor
person, a legal issue is an issue of survival. And for all too many,
channels of access to authority that do not involve lawyers are
closed to poor persons. Several studies have shown that public
and private means of consumer complaint and redress are used far
more frequently by middle-income persons than by poor people.
Whether the number of legal problems faced by poor people
is more or less than the number faced by others is less clear. The
ABA survey indicates some increase in that number as income
rises. I am extremely dubious about that conclusion. Certainly
the quantity of real-estate issues and probate matters is far less
for poor people than for others. But I believe that those matters
are more than offset by the enormous range of questions involving
administrative benefits-social security, aid to dependent children, and so forth-matters that particularly concern poor people.
Further, awareness of the legal dimensions of a problem plainly
increases with education, and education increases with income.
In my view, therefore, though poor people obviously face fewer
legal problems in areas where economic resources are involved,
this reduction is more than offset by the increase in other problems, particularly those relating to administrative benefits.
What then of a graduated fee schedule based on ability to paya system that would require individuals with incomes above the
poverty line but still below, perhaps, $io,ooo annually-to pay a
portion of the costs of essential legal assistance? One argument for
this approach applies, in essence, to every legal services arrange-
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ment. Its proponents urge that at least a minimum fee should be
charged to all legal services clients so that they will have some financial stake in the efforts their lawyers are pursuing. In my view,
this argument is falacious as applied to poor people. A legal controversy terrifies most people, particularly indigents, and lawyers
personify the law, which is why, sadly, so many wait until it is too
late to obtain the help they need. The unfortunate but understandable reaction of a poor person living in a slum tenament on
receiving a subpeona is to ignore it and hope the problem goes
away, only to find that he or she has then been subject to a default
judgment.
There is another, though also controversial argument in favor
of legal-services offices charging on the basis of a graduated fee
schedule for those who have limited resuorces. The argument, of
course, is that this approach will enable service to a far broader
group than would otherwise be possible.
The majority of legal-services lawyers with whom I have discussed that matter disagree. Most often they urge that all possible
energies should be focused solely on poor people-people who
most need those services. Although I have substantial sympathy
for this position, my own view is that far more experimentation
ought to be done with graduated fee schedules than has been the
case up to now.
Analogies to the British legal system should be viewed with
skepticism, for so much of that system is fundamentally different
from ours, but it is worth mention that the just-issued report of
the Royal Commission on Legal Services recommends precisely
this approach as a means to expand the availability of legal
assistance.
In the United States, as in other countries, free or partially subsidized legal assistance has been available based solely on income
levels, even in criminal matters for which the right to legal counsel is now constitutionally gauaranteed. Similarly, the type of
legal services available to those unable to pay has been considered
largely in terms of payment mechanisms. The statute creating
the Legal Services Corporation, for example, mandates an exten-
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sive study of different types of programs, but refers solely to variations in the means of paying lawyers-judicare, pre-paid plans,
and so forth. The results of that study will be available shortly,
and should be of benefit to everyone concerned about the costs,
quality, client satisfaction, and impact of legal assistance efforts.
Another, and not necessarily inconsistent approach is to consider the character of the legal problems involved and other factors, rather than to focus solely on the income of the person facing
the problem. A variety of scales might be adopted in weighing the
extent to which legal counsel ought to be available. One analysis
is suggested by analogy to a recent study prepared pro bono by
Hogan and Hartson for the Legal Services Corporation. That
study considered various arguments concerning right to counsel
in civil cases, and focused on a number of key variables relating to
both the particular proceeding and the parties. Let me mention a
few of those variables, without suggesting that the list is all
inclusive.
First, what is the risk to the individual? In the criminal context,
an indigent is entitled to counsel in any case in which the penalty
may be imprisonment. In civil cases, the obvious analogy is to the
potential of civil commitment. But there are other fundamental
personal interests that may be at stake in a civil proceeding though
they do not necessarily involve incarceration.
Second, what is the degree of state control? In some types of
civil matters-divorce and adoptions are examples-individuals
cannot act except through legal procedures controlled by the state.
Regarding this variable, like the others, the question is often one
of differences in degree rather than in kind.
Third, how complex are the proceedings-how important is a
lawyer's help? Fourth, what is the capacity of the litigant? The
point is obvious in the case of minors and the mentally ill, but
capacity is a relative issue and can vary widley depending on education and other factors. Fifth, what is the relative balance of
abilities among adversary parties in handling the legal matter?
Finally, what about the efficiency of the legal system itself-to
what extent will a proceeding be delayed by lack of counsel?
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Each of these factors, and no doubt others as well, can be analyzed at length, as can the balancing process involved in weighing
their comparative importance. The issues here are broader than
those in right to counsel cases, for they include both legislative
and administrative representation and actions to change or enforce existing laws. But the study that I mentioned has made a
significant start.
Litigation in this area has most often involved an alleged constitutional right to counsel. I believe that a sound case can be made
for that right extending beyond the limited circumstances in
which it has previously been recognized. My expectation is that,
over time, this constitutional right will be recognized in a series
of specific special circumstances, based on factors such as the ones
I have mentioned. A number of incremental steps were taken to
establish the constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases, over
a substantial period of time, until the Supreme Court decided the
Gideon and the Arginsingercases, and I suspect a similar pattern
will occur in civil matters as well, though not without setbacks.
My main point here, however, is that counsel ought to be provided in some civil proceedings to those who cannot afford it-not
because it is constitutionally required but because it is right in
terms of rationing justice. Quite apart from protecting any particular individual, the legal system becomes dangerously skewed
when the legal rights of one group-consumers, tenants, or others
-are not represented. A brilliant new book by Professor Morton
Horowitz on the development of our legal system during this
country's first one hundred years underscores the impact of the
skewing process; although significant steps have been taken to
minimize the dangers, they are still clear and present.
Most obviously, renewed efforts are needed to prevent legal
problems from arising. Preventive steps, particularly through requiring simplification and uniformity in common and recurring
legal matters between private parties with equal resources, can
often do far more good for more people than any number of lawyers. Let me offer one example suggested by Professor Abram
Chayes. In New York City, as in many urban areas, thousands of
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evictions are sought each year on grounds of non-payment of rent.
The landord's failure to meet standards established under the
housing code is a common defense. If landlords were required to
produce certificates of habitability before bringing suit to evict,
the savings in both court and lawyering time could be substantial.
A danger, of course, is that the burdens of many proposed reforms in the legal system-reforms to minimize what I once referred to as legal pollution-may fall primarily on poor people,
and particular care must be taken to ensure that those without
political muscle are not unfairly burdened in the name of reform.
When a legal problem cannot be avoided, every effort should be
made to enable people to handle the matter without a lawyer.
Legal Services programs have pioneered-out of necessity triggered by scarce resources-in designing do-it-yourself kits and,
when an advisor is needed, in the use of paralegals acting under a
lawyer's supervision. My guess is that by the end of this century,
if not before, paralegals will outnumber lawyers in this country.
This change is part of a larger pattern-the shift toward wholesaling legal services whenever possible rather than retailing them,
toward mass-production whenever possible rather than individually negotiated lawyers' services for individual clients. Many bemoan this shift, including, I am sure, a number in this room. I
have a fair degree of sympathy for their views. Among other concerns, it is far less satisfying to be a wholesaler.
But the harsh fact is that most Americans are unable to afford
the legal help they need when they need it, and the only way to
meet their requirements is through a variety of arrangements far
removed from the traditional, cottage-industry approach. Many
of these methods are already well under way. Group and prepaid
plans are now established parts of the legal landscape, and I have
no doubt that they will continue to expand steadily. Unions negotiating benefits for their members have been the major organizing
force for much of this effort. I believe that the growth of legal
clinics will be even more rapid.
Given this range of mechanisms, most of the needs within a
community for legal services could be met without public re-
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sources, if there is a serious planning process devoted to that end.
It should consider what types of problems for what income groups
can be handled by legal clinics, by group plans, and by other collective arrangements as well as by lawyers working individually.
For those below poverty levels, publically-funded legal assistance programs will continue to be essential, and they will need far
more funding than in the past. Based on my own past experience,
I believe that the delivery of services to poor people should be
through a variety of different payment mechanisms-singly and in
combination-using private lawyers as well as staff attorneys, depending on the particular circumstances.
In every community with which I am familiar, however, justice
will continue to be rationed unfairly unless there is a significant
increase in the pro bono contributions of private and public lawyers. Perhaps more than any other urban bar, this Association and
its members have led in the effort to promote those contributions.
I realize that the Association is now considering a far-reaching
proposal to require a minimum level of pro bono services by all
members. I support that basic concept with enthusiasm and have
urged its inclusion in the new Code of Professional Conduct, currently being drafted by an ABA Commission, of which I am a
member.
A wide range of concerns has been raised about the concept of
a modest required contribution of time and talent by all lawyers,
and I certainly recognize that lawyers-particularly in New York
-donate more of their efforts in the public interest than any other
profession. Why lawyers, and not doctors-for example-is the
most common complaint. My own reply can be simply stated:
lawyers are an essential part of the public justice system, with
monopolistic access to the workings of the system. With that monopoly comes a public obligation to help ensure the sound workings of the system-otherwise the rationing of justice becomes
warped in ways that are dangerous not only to poor people, who
are denied an opportunity to use the system, but also to the public
generally, who are denied a legal system that works fairly.
Some lawyers have argued that there is little that they can do
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to help poor people-that their professional competence is in corporate finance, or in some other area far removed from poor people's problems. But many legal aid programs have found that,
with relatively modest amounts of training, even bond indenture
lawyers can re-emerge from their specialist shells. Much of the
work done in legal services offices requires substantial experience
as well as skill-just as in private lawyers offices. But private lawyers from a wide range of specialty backgrounds can be of immense help in serving poor people.
Let me relate just a few examples of the types of pro bono arrangements already in operation. Private lawyers in many cities
regularly handle certain categories of cases for legal services offices.
These cases may be in a single substantive area such as bankruptcy,
or a firm may act as a support center for complex litigation. A
number of firms have assigned one or more of their lawyers, paralegals, and support staff to work in legal services offices for periods
of up to six months. Further, some firms regularly handle cases in
which both parties are indigents and the legal services program
would have a conflict of interest if it were to represent more than
one of the litigants. Private attorneys may also agree in advance
to help legal services programs whenever caseloads become particularly heavy.
Other firms provide training in particular areas of the law to
legal services lawyers. Litigation techniques are the most common
of those areas. And some firms have helped legal services programs
to prepare basic forms and manuals to deal with special fields.
I suspect that some private lawyers who resist pro bono help to
poor people are scared-scared that they may be embarrassed, or
at least uncomfortable, in working with people from different
backgrounds than their own. There are many sound arguments
for quality clinical courses in law school-courses that provide
opportunities for students to work with poor people under careful
supervision. But among the most important reasons-perhaps the
most important-is that these clinical courses minimize this understandable and very human reaction. They give students a sense
of just how terrifying the law can be to many poor people, how
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often lawyers are the law for those people, how helpful attorneys
can be, and how rewarding it is to provide that help.
Private lawyers are often joined by legal services lawyers in resisting required or even voluntary pro bono efforts. Some staff
attorneys in legal assistance programs argue that they want to
practice law for poor people, not supervise private lawyers who
provide that service. More generally, some legal services programs
have, in my view, shown too little understanding of the importance of working with the private bar. Several programs here in
New York are prime examples of how useful those efforts can be
when there is a significant commitment on both sides.
These, then, are some tentative thoughts on how, working together, we can better ration justice.

